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Noncompliance and the Effects of the Minimum Wage on 
Hours and Welfare in Competitive Labor Markets 
 
This paper shows that increases in the minimum wage rate can have ambiguous effects on 
the working hours and welfare of employed workers in competitive labor markets. The reason 
is that employers may not comply with the minimum wage legislation and instead pay a lower 
subminimum wage rate. If workers are risk neutral, we prove that working hours and welfare 
are invariant to the minimum wage rate. If workers are risk averse and imprudent (which is 
the empirically likely case), then working hours decrease with the minimum wage rate, while 
their welfare may increase. 
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 1 Introduction
The minimum wage rate is one of the cornerstones of protective labor legislation. Its purpose
is to reduce income inequality by redistributing incomes toward the working poor, even if
this is achieved at the cost of eﬃciency. However, the traditional view among economists is
that the labor market for low-wage workers is reasonably competitive so that increases in the
m i n i m u mw a g er a t eh a v ea d v e r s ec o n s e q u e n c e sf o rs o m el o w - w a g ew o r k e r ss i n c ee m p l o y e r s ’
demand for labor falls. Ironically, then, the minimum wage legislation may end up harming
many of those for whom it was intended to beneﬁt.
There is persuasive empirical evidence that increases in the minimum wage rate reduce
the number of employed workers in typical low-wage labor markets. For example, Neumark
and Wascher (1992), Deere et al. (1995), and Burkhauser (2000) ﬁnd a negative relation
between the minimum wage rate and the number of employed workers in low-pay jobs.1
At the same time, there is conﬂicting empirical evidence about the eﬀect of the minimum
wage rate on working hours for the workers that remain employed. Thus, Neumark et al.
(2004) ﬁnd that working hours decrease with the minimum wage rate, while Zavodny (2000)
ﬁnds that working hours increase with the minimum wage rate. Note, however, that the
studies concerned with the number of employed workers have almost exclusively focused on
teenagers, most of whom are only temporarily holding low-paying jobs. On the other hand,
working-hour studies are, by their very nature, mostly concerned with adult breadwinners
who are permanently attached to low-wage labor markets and whose well-being is likely to
be greatly aﬀected by changes in working hours. Thus, the policy objective of reducing
income inequality is, arguably, more closely related to improving the earning prospects of
low-pay adult workers whose income is the primary source of support for themselves and
their dependents, rather than to reducing the job losses of teenagers who are often destined
to be employed in high-paying jobs in the future. This paper therefore examines how the
minimum wage rate aﬀects the competitively determined working hours and welfare of the
1 However, Card and Krueger (1995) conclude that minimum wage increases may have either negligible or
positive eﬀects on employment, which they account for by suggesting that market imperfections may make
employers behave monopsonistically. See Neumark and Wascher (2007) for a comprehensive survey of the
recent empirical literature for the U.S. and many other countries.
1mainly adult workers who are permanently employed in low-wage labor markets, and, for
simplicity, ignores changes in the number of employed workers.
The model in this paper explicitly incorporates that ﬁrms may not comply with the
minimum-wage legislation, which gives rise to a competitively determined endogenous sub-
minimum wage rate that depends on the minimum wage rate.2 This is important, because
there is ample evidence that noncompliance with the minimum-wage legislation is rampant.
Thus, Ashenfelter and Smith (1979) estimate from the 1975 Current Population Survey that
the overall compliance rate is only 60%, and for males aged 17-19 a mere 35%. More re-
cently, Weil (2005) used the year-2000 Department of Labor survey of the apparel industry
in the Los Angeles area to show that only 46% of the employers comply with the statutory
minimum wage rate and that 27% of the workers are paid less than the minimum wage rate.
Finally, Cortes (2005), based on the 1997 and 1998 Current Population Survey, estimates
that the compliance rate is only 28% for native males and 20% for immigrant males.
The reason for the low rate of compliance with the minimum-wage legislation seems to
be that enforcement is generally quite lax. First, the probability that a noncomplying ﬁrm
will be caught is small. In fact, the annual likelihood that a ﬁrm will even be inspected
by the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor is less than 10% (Weil, 2005).
Second, the penalty for a noncomplying ﬁrm that is caught is minimal. Indeed, it typically
consists of no more than having to pay workers back wages equalling the diﬀerence between
the minimum wage rate and the subminimum wage rate already paid, and no government
ﬁne is imposed (Ashenfelter and Smith, 1979). Even if the ﬁrm is subject to additional
penalties, it can still expect to gain from noncompliance as long as the expected wage rate
2 Previous theoretical models of noncompliance in Ashenfelter and Smith (1979), Grenier (1982), Chang
and Ehrlich (1985), and Yaniv (2001) take the subminimum wage rate as exogenous and ignore that workers
may adjust their labor supply in response to the uncertainty arising from not knowing whether a noncom-
plying ﬁrm will be caught. Yaniv (2004) allows for an endogenous subminimum wage rate in a model with
risk-neutral workers, and asserts (without proof) that noncompliance has an ambiguous eﬀect on employ-
ment and makes workers worse oﬀ. However, these conclusions are incorrect as will be shown below. Basu
et al. (2009) analyze a model in which both the subminimum wage rate and the enforcement intensity are
endogenous. Danziger (2009) shows that if the subminimum wage rate is endogenous and the working hours
are ﬁxed, then the minimum wage rate turns small ﬁrms into endogenous monopsonists. See Card and
Krueger (1995), Strobl and Walsh (2003), and Gindling and Terrell (2009) for empirical evidence about the
relationship between the minimum and subminimum wage rates.
2(deﬁned as the subminimum wage rate plus the probability that the ﬁrm is caught times the
penalties the ﬁrm is then obliged to pay) is less than the minimum wage rate. Accordingly,
the minimum-wage legislation has a built-in incentive for noncompliance. By paying only
the illegal subminimum wage rate, a ﬁrm takes a calculated gamble with a positive expected
payoﬀ.3
The paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the equilibrium eﬀects of the minimum
wage rate on working hours and welfare in an otherwise competitive labor market. The
endogeneity of the subminimum wage rate plays a crucial role in the analysis. If workers
are risk neutral, an increase in the minimum wage rate causes the subminimum wage rate
to decrease to the extent needed to leave the expected wage rate unaﬀected. The working
hours in the competitive equilibrium are, therefore, unchanged, and the introduction of a
minimum wage rate and increases in its size have no welfare eﬀects. In the empirically
more relevant case that workers are income risk averse, the eﬀects of the minimum wage
rate depend on the workers’ relative prudence. In particular, if workers are imprudent (as
appears likely), an increase in the minimum wage rate reduces the subminimum wage rate
by less than required to keep the expected wage rate unchanged. The higher expected wage
rate means that the increase in the minimum wage rate reduces working hours, may increase
the workers’ welfare, and reduces expected proﬁts. On the other hand, if workers are prudent
(which appears unlikely), an increase in the minimum wage rate reduces the subminimum
wage rate so much that the expected wage rate decreases. This leads to increased working
hours, a reduction in workers’ welfare, and increased proﬁts.4
3 Workers who are underpaid only rarely complain to the Wage and Hour Division of the Department
of Labor, presumably out of fear that they will be marked as trouble makers and that the employer will
retaliate by dismissing the complainants. Note that the employer cannot be sued for back wages unless the
workers are willing to testify in open court, and that many of the underpaid workers are illegal immigrants.
4 In contrast, if the subminimum wage rate were ﬁxed exogenously, the qualitative results would be the
same as with full compliance with the minimum wage rate: An increase in the minimum wage rate would
always increase in the expected wage, and hence always decrease working hours which must be rationed.
The eﬀect on workers’ welfare would depend on their risk preferences, while proﬁts would always decrease.
32 The Model
Consider a labor market with a unit continuum of homogeneous workers and a unit contin-
uum of homogeneous employers. A worker’s utility is given by u(y) − v(h), u0(y) > 0a n d
v0(h) > 0, where y denotes the worker’s income from work and h denotes the time spent
working. For a given wage rate w>0, a worker’s labor income is y = wh, and the corre-
sponding utility is u(wh)−v(h). A worker chooses how much to work in order to maximize
his utility. This implies that a worker’s labor supply is a function h(w)o ft h ew a g er a t e ,
and, assuming an internal solution, is determined by wu0(y) − v0(h) = 0. It is also assumed
that u0(y)+yu00(y) > 0, so that the labor supply increases with the wage rate.5 Ap o s i t i v e
eﬀect of a minimum wage rate on working hours cannot then be attributed to the labor
supply being a backward-bending function of the wage rate.
Each employer’s production is given by f( ), f0 > 0a n df00 < 0, where   denotes labor
input. Normalizing the price of output to one, an employer’s proﬁti sf( )−w .A ne m p l o y e r
chooses the labor input in order to maximize proﬁt. The demand for labor can therefore be
written as a function  (w) of the wage rate, and, assuming an internal solution, is determined
by f0( ) − w =0 .S i n c ef00 < 0, the demand for labor decreases with the wage rate.
The labor market is competitive, and the equilibrium wage rate with no minimum-wage
legislation is denoted by wc. Since the measures of workers and employers are equal, wc is
obtained by solving h(wc)= (wc).
Suppose that a minimum-wage legislation is enacted with a statutory minimum wage rate
m that exceeds wc. However, employers may choose to violate the law by paying only the
lower subminimum wage rate w1. This subminimum wage rate equalizes supply and demand
f o rl a b o ri nt h ec o m p e t i t i v el a b o rm a r k e tt h a ti n t e r n a l i z e st h a tn o n c o m p l y i n ge m p l o y e r sw i l l










which is positive since w2u00(y)−v00(h) < 0 from the second-order condition for a maximum. The assumption
implies that a worker’s relative risk aversion is less than 1.
4sometimes be detected and penalized.
The probability that a noncomplying employer will be detected is φ ∈ (0,1). If detected,
the employer must retroactively compensate workers with a backpay which, including awards,
is proportional to the gap between the minimum wage rate and the subminimum wage rate
that was actually paid. Stated formally, the backpay is β(m − w1), where β ≥ 1i st h e
constant penalty rate. Thus, the subminimum wage rate augmented by the backpay is
w2 ≡ w1 + β(m − w1). Taking this into account, the expected wage rate is w∗ ≡ (1 −
φ)w1 + φw2 = w1 + φβ(m − w1). It is assumed that the expected backpay is less than the
underpayment, φβ < 1, which is what provides employers with the incentive to violate the
minimum-wage legislation. It is also assumed that w∗ >φ β m ,s ot h a tw1 > 0.
Employers are risk neutral and choose to pay less than the mandated minimum wage
rate in order to maximize their expected proﬁt f( ) − w∗ . Hence, the labor demand is
determined solely by the expected wage rate and therefore depends on the minimum wage
rate only to the extent that the latter aﬀects the expected wage rate. Similarly, the labor
demand does not directly depend on the subminimum wage rate, the penalty rate, or the
probability of detection. In other words, the employers’ demand for labor is the same as if
w∗ were a certain wage rate. The demand is therefore given by  (w∗).
3 Risk-Neutral Workers
In this section we assume that workers are income risk neutral, i.e., u00(y)=0 . Aw o r k e r
is then only concerned with the expected wage rate and not with the extent to which it is
uncertain. His utility can be taken to be wh − v(h), and he chooses how much to work in
order to maximize his expected utility w∗h − v(h). For a given w∗, the expected utility is
independent of m, and the supply of labor is therefore also independent of m. Accordingly,
the supply of labor is the same as if w∗ were a certain wage rate and is given by h(w∗).
In equilibrium, the expected wage rate satisﬁes h(w∗)= (w∗)a n di si d e n t i c a lt ot h e
equilibrium wage rate in the absence of a minimum wage rate, i.e., w∗ = wc. The explanation
is that the competitively determined subminimum wage adjusts to w1 =( wc−φβm)/(1−φβ),
which is suﬃciently below wc so that the expected wage rate is reduced to wc.
5Because the subminimum wage rate is endogenous in the competitive equilibrium, neither
the minimum wage rate itself, nor the penalty rate, nor the probability that noncompliance
will be detected have any eﬀect on the expected wage rate. It follows then that the equi-
librium working hours with a statutory minimum wage rate are identical to the equilibrium
working hours in the absence of a statutory minimum wage rate. Thus, in the case of risk-
neutral workers, the expected wage rate and the equilibrium working hours are invariant to
the introduction of a minimum wage rate and to changes in its level. Furthermore, since
both the workers’ expected utility and the employers’ expected proﬁt are also invariant, the
minimum wage rate has no welfare eﬀects.
4 Risk-Averse Workers
For the remainder of the paper we assume that workers are income risk averse, i.e., u00(y) <
0. A worker is then adversely aﬀected by the income risk stemming from the uncertainty
about whether the subminimum market wage rate will be augmented by a backpay. The
subminimum wage rate can be written as w1 =( w∗ − φβm)/(1 − φβ)a n dt h ea u g m e n t e d
subminimum wage rate as w2 =[ ( 1 −β)w∗+(1−φ)βm]/(1−φβ). The workers’ corresponding
incomes are y1 ≡ w1h and y2 ≡ w2h. Thus, holding the expected wage rate constant, for a
given labor supply a higher minimum wage rate is associated with a lower y1 and a higher
y2, and hence with a riskier income.
The income uncertainty might inﬂuence the labor supply which is found by maximizing
a worker’s expected utility
Eu(y) − v(h)=( 1− φ)u(y1)+φu(y2) − v(h).
For a given β and φ, the labor supply is now a function h(w∗,m)o fw∗ and m, and assuming
an internal solution, satisﬁes E[wu0(y)] − v0(h)=0 .
4.1 Equilibrium Working Hours and Expected Wage Rate
In order to clear the labor market, the expected wage rate has to satisfy the equilibrium
condition h(w∗,m)= (w∗). To determine the eﬀect of the minimum wage rate on the





∂ /∂w∗ − ∂h/∂w∗. (1)
The equilibrium working hours are denoted by H.S i n c edH/dm =( ∂ /∂w∗)(dw∗/dm),
the eﬀect of the minimum wage rate on the equilibrium working hours is in the opposite





1 − (∂h/∂w∗)/(∂ /∂w∗)
, (2)
The denominator of dH/dm is positive (since ∂ /∂w∗ < 0a n du0(y)+yu00(y) > 0 ⇒
∂h/∂w∗ > 0). The numerator is the eﬀect of an increase in the minimum wage rate (for a
given w∗) on labor supply, and it is obtained by diﬀerentiating E[wu0(y)] − v0(h)=0w i t h







Since E[w2u00(y)] − v00(h) < 0 from the second-order condition for a maximum, ∂h/∂m and
hence dH/dm has the same sign as ∂E[wu0(y)]/∂m, or equivalently, as ∂E[yu0(y)]/∂m,w h i c h
is the eﬀect of an increase in the minimum wage rate on the expected value of the income-
weighted marginal utility of income, E[yu0(y)]. Thus, due to the income uncertainty created
by the imperfectly enforced minimum wage rate, the impact on the equilibrium working
hours of an increase in the minimum wage rate depends on the curvature of yu0(y): there
is no eﬀect if yu0(y) is linear, a negative eﬀect if yu0(y) is concave, and a positive eﬀect if
yu0(y)i sc o n v e x .
The change in the labor supply constitutes the optimal compromise between two oppos-
ing forces: on the one hand, the increased riskiness of the wage rate makes it less attractive
to work, which tends to reduce the labor supply; on the other hand, the increased riskiness
of the wage rate also makes it more essential to hedge against the income risk by mak-
ing a precautionary increase in the labor supply. The overall eﬀect of an increase in the
minimum wage rate on the labor supply can be precisely described in terms of the work-
ers’ relative prudence, which is deﬁned as P(y) ≡− yu000(y)/u00(y) (Kimball, 1990). Since
∂2[yu0(y)]/∂y2 = −u00(y)[P(y) − 2], it follows that yu0(y)i sl i n e a ri ny if P(y)=2 ,c o n c a v e
7in y if P(y) < 2, and convex in y if P(y) > 2. An increase in the minimum wage rate and
the consequent risk therefore has no eﬀect on the equilibrium working hours if the relative
prudence equals two, but reduces the equilibrium working hours if the relative prudence is
less than two, i.e., if the workers are “imprudent”, and increases the equilibrium working
hours if the relative prudence exceeds two, i.e., if the workers are “prudent”. Consequently,
in the case of risk-averse workers, the legislation of a minimum wage rate or an increase
in an existing minimum wage rate has a theoretically ambiguous eﬀect on working hours.
However, since empirical estimates of relative prudence are very low,6 it follows that in
p r a c t i c e ,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h em i n i m u mw a g er a t ei sl i k e l yt ob ea s s o c i a t e dw i t had e c r e a s ei n
working hours.
The change in labor supply, which gives rise to a proportional change in the expected
income, can be understood as the workers’ optimal precautionary reaction to increased
income risk at a given expected wage rate. Thus, the change in labor supply is analogous to
the response of precautionary savings in the face of increased risk of the return on savings
at a given expected interest rate. In both cases, the question is how much of a certain
utility to sacriﬁce (in the minimum-wage case by working more and in the precautionary-
savings case by reducing current consumption) in exchange for a higher expected value of
an uncertain income. Thus, just as the optimal savings is the same at all levels of risk if
the relative prudence equals two, the optimal labor supply is also invariant to risk if the
relative prudence equals two. Further, since the precautionary motive causes risk to have a
negative or positive eﬀect on savings depending on whether savers are imprudent or prudent,
it similarly causes risk to have a negative or positive eﬀect on labor supply depending on
whether workers are imprudent or prudent.7
While the signs of dH/dm and dw∗/dm are not aﬀected by how the labor supply and
demand change with the minimum wage rate, their magnitudes are. Thus, it is clear from
(1) and (2) that the more labor supply increases with w∗ (i.e., the larger is dh/dw∗), the less
6 The ﬁndings in Dynan (1993), Guiso et al. (1992), and Parker (1999) indicate that the relative prudence
is close to zero.
7 See Parker et al. (2005) and Flod´ en et al. (2006) for studies of the impact of wage uncertainty on labor
supply.
8responsive are the equilibrium working hoursa n dt h ee x p e c t e dw a g er a t et oa ni n c r e a s ei n
m (i.e., the smaller are the absolute values of dH/dm and dw∗/dm). On the other hand, the
more the demand decreases with w∗ (i.e., the smaller is ∂ /∂w∗), the more the equilibrium
working hours and the less the expected wage rate respond to an increase in m (i.e., the
larger is the absolute value of dH/dm and the smaller is the absolute value of dw∗/dm).8
4.2 Welfare
We now turn to the welfare eﬀects of a minimum wage rate. Since a competitive equilibrium
without a minimum wage rate is Pareto optimal, it is impossible that both workers and
employers gain from a minimum wage rate. In other words, if one group gains, it must be
at the expense of the other, and both groups may lose.
First, we examine the eﬀect of an increase in the minimum wage rate on the workers’
expected utility. For a given expected wage rate, the expected utility is exposed to an
uncertainty eﬀect that stems from the increase in income uncertainty caused by an increase
in the minimum wage rate. The uncertainty eﬀect is always negative. Additionally, unless
t h ew o r k e r s ’r e l a t i v ep r u d e n c ee q u a l st w o ,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h em i n i m u mw a g er a t ec h a n g e s
the equilibrium expected wage rate, and this change has an expected-wage eﬀect on the
workers’ expected utility. If the workers are imprudent and the expected wage rate therefore
increases, the expected-wage eﬀect is positive. The gain from the higher expected wage
rate may then outweigh the loss from the increased uncertainty. On the other hand, if the
workers are prudent and the expected wage rate therefore decreases, the expected-wage eﬀect
is negative. The uncertainty and expected-wage eﬀects of an increase in the minimum wage
rate then both reduce the workers’ expected utility. This is true even though working hours
increase, since such an increase is generatedb ya ni n c r e a s ei nt h ew o r k e r s ’l a b o rs u p p l y
which only serves to ameliorate the negative impact of the increased uncertainty.
To obtain a precise assessment of how the minimum wage rate aﬀects the workers’ ex-
8 The model assumes that the output price is ﬁxed. However, a higher w∗ increases production costs
and possibly also the demand for the ﬁrms’ product (if the elasticity of the labor demand with respect to
w∗ exceeds −1 and the product is normal (see Kennan, 1995)), both of which could lead to a higher price.
Such a price increase would be equivalent to having a larger value of ∂ /∂w∗ and would therefore not aﬀect
the signs of dH/dm and dw∗/dm.
9pected utility, we diﬀerentiate Eu(y) − v(h) with respect to m.I f S(y) ≡− yu00(y)/u0(y)
denotes the relative risk aversion at income y,a n d
A ≡
(1 − φ)φβh[u0(y1) − u0(y2)]




[1/u0(y1) − 1/u0(y2)]{E[w2u00(y)] − v00(h)}
,










To understand this expression, consider a hypothetical case where the demand for labor
is completely inelastic, i.e., ∂ /∂w∗ =1 /f00( ) = 0. An increase in the minimum wage
rate would then not change the equilibrium working hours, so that, according to eq. (3),
the eﬀect on workers’ expected utility would have the same sign as S(y2) − S(y1). Hence,
if the relative risk aversion is constant, the positive expected-wage eﬀect of an increase in
the minimum wage rate exactly oﬀsets the negative uncertainty eﬀect, leaving the workers’
expected utility unchanged. If the relative risk aversion is increasing, then the expected-wage
eﬀect is positive and so large that it dominates the negative uncertainty eﬀect, causing the
workers’ expected utility to increase. If the relative risk aversion is decreasing, then even a
positive expected-wage eﬀect cannot oﬀset the negative uncertainty eﬀect and the workers’
expected utility decreases.
T h ee x p l a n a t i o nf o rt h ea b o v er e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nt h ew o r k e r s ’r e l a t i v er i s ka v e r s i o n
and their expected utility is that, on the assumption that the demand for labor is completely
inelastic, an increase in the minimum wage rate would cause the expected wage rate to adjust
suﬃciently such that the income-weighted marginal utility of income, E[yu0(y)], and hence
the workers’ labor supply, would be unchanged. The combined uncertainty and expected-
wage eﬀects on the workers’ expected utility, Eu(y) − v(h), would then depend solely on
how u(y)c h a n g e sw i t hyu0(y). Observe that an increase in the minimum wage rate reduces
y1 and hence y1u0(y1), and increases y2 and hence y2u0(y2). Also, observe that u(y)i sa
linear, convex, or concave function of yu0(y) depending on whether the relative risk aversion
10is constant, increasing, or decreasing.9 Accordingly, the workers’ expected utility would
be unchanged if their relative risk aversion is constant, would increase if their relative risk
aversion increases, and would decrease if their relative risk aversion decreases.10
In contrast to this hypothetical case, in reality the demand for labor is not completely
inelastic. Accordingly, except if the relative prudence equals two and uncertainty does not
aﬀect the labor supply, the sensitivity of the demand for labor to w∗ inﬂuences the expected-
wage eﬀect of an increase in the minimum wage rate. For all other values of the relative
prudence, the more the demand for labor decreases with w∗ (i.e., the smaller is ∂ /∂w∗),
the smaller is the absolute change in w∗ (see eq. (1)) and hence in the expected-wage
eﬀect. Consequently, eq. (3) shows that an increase in the minimum wage rate will increase
the workers’ expected utility if their relative risk aversion is suﬃciently increasing, but will
otherwise decrease the workers’ expected utility.
Next, we examine the eﬀect of a minimum wage rate on the employers’ expected proﬁt.
For a given expected wage rate, the expected proﬁti su n a ﬀected by uncertainty. The eﬀect
of an increase in the minimum wage rate on the expected proﬁt is therefore fully deter-
mined by its eﬀect on the equilibrium expected wage rate. Thus, if the workers’ relative
prudence equals two and the expected wage rate is unchanged, then the expected proﬁti s
also unchanged. On the other hand, if the workers are imprudent and the expected wage
rate increases, then the expected proﬁt decreases, while if the workers are prudent and the
expected wage rate decreases, the expected proﬁti n c r e a s e s .





which has the same sign as S0(y).
10 Barsky et al. (1997) and Guiso and Paiella (2008) provide empirical evidence of increasing relative risk
aversion.
115 The Penalty Rate and The Probability of Detection
To determine the eﬀect of an increase in the penalty rate on the expected wage rate, we





∂ /∂w∗ − ∂h/∂w∗.





1 − (∂h/∂w∗)/(∂ /∂w∗)
.
Accordingly, dH/dβ has the same sign as the eﬀect of an increase in the penalty rate (for a
given w∗) on the labor supply, which in turn has the same sign as the eﬀect of an increase
in the penalty rate on the expected value of the income-weighted marginal utility of income,
E[yu0(y)]. The sign of dw∗/dβ is the opposite of that of dH/dβ.
For a given expected wage rate, an increase in the penalty rate leads to an increase in the
backpay workers receive if a noncomplying employer is detected. Hence, the augmented sub-
minimum wage rate increases, and therefore the subminimum wage rate itself must decrease.
Accordingly, the workers’ income uncertainty increases. It follows that the qualitative results
obtained for an increase in the minimum wage rate on working hours and welfare hold also
for an increase in the penalty rate. An increase in penalty rate is, therefore, a substitute for
an increase in the minimum wage rate.
To determine the eﬀect of an increase in the probability that a noncomplying ﬁrm is






∂ /∂w∗ − ∂h/∂w∗.





1 − (∂h/∂w∗)/(∂ /∂w∗)
.
Accordingly, dH/dφ has the same sign as the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h ep r o b a b i l i t yo f
detection (for a given w∗) on the labor supply and hence on the expected value of the
12income-weighted marginal utility of income. The sign of dw∗/dφ is the opposite of that of
dH/dφ.
For a given expected wage rate, a higher probability of detection not only raises the
likelihood that workers receive w2 and lowers the likelihood that they receive only w1,i t
also decreases w1 and either leaves w2 unchanged (if β =1 )o ri n c r e a s e sw2 (if β>1).
Consequently, an increase in φ is associated with a riskier income for the workers, and the
direction of the change in working hours depends on the workers’ relative prudence in a
s i m i l a rw a ya sf o ra ni n c r e a s ei nm.
T u r n i n gt ot h ew e l f a r ee ﬀects of an increase in the probability of detection, Appendix B
shows that the direction of the eﬀect on the workers’ expected utility depends on the workers’
relative risk aversion in a similar way as for an increase in the minimum wage rate.11 Since
the ﬁrms’ expected proﬁt varies inversely with the expected wage rate, it can be concluded
that the qualitative implications of an increase in the probability of detection on working
hours and welfare are similar to those obtained for an increase in the minimum wage rate.
Accordingly, like an increase in the penalty rate, an increase in the probability of detection
is a substitute for an increase in the minimum wage rate.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has shown that increases in the minimum wage rate can have an ambiguous
eﬀect on the working hours of employed workers (as distinct from the number of employed
workers) and on their welfare in competitive labor markets. The reason is that employers
can choose not to comply with the minimum wage legislation and instead pay only the
lower subminimum wage rate. Employers that are caught paying less than the mandated
minimum wage rate must pay back wages and possibly other penalties. The labor demand
of noncomplying employers therefore depends solely on the expected wage rate, which is less
than the minimum wage rate. The uncertainty about whether a noncomplying employer will
be caught and penalized may aﬀect the workers’ labor supply, which therefore will depend on
11 The determination of the welfare eﬀects cannot rely on the proof for an increase in the minimum wage
rate which assumes that the probabilities of receiving w1 and w2 are unchanged.
13both the expected wage rate and the minimum wage rate. In particular, in the empirically
likely case that workers are imprudent, the additional uncertainty associated with an increase
in the minimum wage rate will lead to a decrease in the labor supply and hence in working
hours in the competitive equilibrium.
An interesting implication of the model in this paper is that increases in the penalty rate
or in the probability of detection can be used as substitutes for increases in the minimum
wage rate. This may be important in practice since increasing the penalty rate (e.g., by
encouraging workers to sue for liquidated damages) or increasing the probability of detection
(e.g., by inspecting more ﬁrms) can be done administratively and are therefore politically
easier to implement than increasing the minimum wage rate which would require legislative
action.
14Appendix A
The Minimum Wage Rate and Workers’ Expected Utility












where the ﬁrst term is the uncertainty eﬀect of an increase in the minimum wage rate and
the second term is the expected-wage eﬀect of the increase. By the envelope theorem, a
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The Probability of Detection and Workers’ Expected Utility












where the ﬁrst term is the uncertainty eﬀect of an increase in the probability of detection
and the second term is the expected-wage eﬀect of the increase. By the envelope theorem,
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(1 − φβ){E[w2u00(y)] − v00(h)}
is positive, and γ ≡ φ(β − 1)/(1 − φ).
If the demand for labor is completely inelastic (i.e., 1/f00( ) = 0), the sign of d[Eu(y) −











(B1) vanishes if the relative risk aversion is constant, indicating that the workers’ expected
utility is independent of the probability of detection.
To determine how the probability of detection aﬀects workers’ expected utility if the
relative risk aversion is not constant, observe that if β =1⇔ γ = 0, then (B1) vanishes
if y2 converges to y1, and its derivative with respect to y2 is u0(y1)u0(y2)[S(y2) − S(y1)].
Accordingly, if β = 1, the workers’ expected utility increases with the probability of detection
if S(y2) >S (y1), and decreases with the probability of detection if S(y2) <S (y1).










This derivative vanishes if y1 converges to y2,a n dd i ﬀerentiating it again with respect to y1
yields φ(1 − φ)−1u0(y1)u0(y2)[S(y1) − S(y2)]. Since y1 <y 2, it follows that (A1) increases
with β if S(y2) >S (y1)a n dd e c r e a s e sw i t hβ if S(y2) <S (y1). Consequently, for all β,
if the relative risk aversion is increasing, the workers’ expected utility increases with the
probability of detection; conversely, if the relative risk aversion is decreasing, the workers’
expected utility decreases with the probability of detection.
Reintroducing that the demand for labor is not completely inelastic (i.e., 1/f00( ) < 0)
does not change the sign of the expected-wage eﬀect, but reduces its absolute value (except
if the relative prudence equals two so that there is no expected-wage eﬀect). Since the
uncertainty eﬀect is negative, the workers’ expected utility increases with the probability
of detection if their relative risk aversion is suﬃciently increasing, but decreases with the
probability of detection otherwise.
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